Geopolitical Cyber Risk: How Global Conflict Can Change Your Organisation's Exposure

Geopolitical cyber risk is the risk that global political events change the likelihood or nature of a cyber incident affecting your organisation. Armed conflict, sanctions, diplomatic tensions, and state-sponsored or politically motivated cyber activity can all shift the threat environment in ways that affect organisations well beyond the immediate parties involved.

Most organisations are not direct targets of state-sponsored campaigns. However, indirect exposure is common and often underestimated. Organisations can be affected through their suppliers, technology platforms, sector associations, geographic footprint, or simply by operating internet-facing infrastructure during a period of elevated adversary activity.

This article explains what geopolitical cyber risk is, how it creates both direct and indirect exposure, what problems organisations commonly face in assessing it, and how a structured, intelligence-led approach can help boards and security teams make better decisions.

What Is Geopolitical Cyber Risk?

Geopolitical cyber risk refers to the intersection of global political events and cyber threats. It encompasses state-sponsored cyber operations, hacktivist campaigns motivated by political causes, opportunistic attacks that increase during periods of conflict, and the downstream effects of sanctions, supply chain disruption, and shifting adversary priorities.

The risk operates at multiple levels. At the strategic level, nation-states conduct cyber operations to achieve political, military, or economic objectives. At the operational level, state-aligned groups and hacktivists target organisations they associate with opposing governments, sectors, or values. At the opportunistic level, criminal actors and low-sophistication groups exploit the increased noise and distraction that conflict creates.

The Australian Signals Directorate's Annual Cyber Threat Report 2024-25 identifies state-sponsored cyber activity as a persistent and growing concern, noting that Australian organisations across all sectors face threats from sophisticated actors with strategic intent. The report highlights that critical infrastructure, government, and private sector organisations are all within scope of adversary interest.

The key question for security leaders is not whether geopolitical events are happening, but whether those events change the risk level for their specific organisation, sector, suppliers, or technology environment. That question requires more than monitoring news headlines. It requires structured threat intelligence mapped to business context.

How Global Conflict Changes Cyber Exposure

Active armed conflict amplifies cyber risk across the threat landscape. Adversaries with state backing increase operational tempo. Hacktivist groups mobilise around political causes. Criminal actors exploit the distraction and disruption that conflict creates. The cumulative effect is a higher-noise, higher-risk environment that affects organisations far beyond the conflict zone.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict provides the clearest recent example. Following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Western governments issued multiple advisories warning of increased cyber activity from Russian state-sponsored actors including GRU-linked APT28. These advisories noted that organisations in NATO-aligned countries, critical infrastructure sectors, and industries supporting Ukraine faced elevated targeting risk, regardless of whether they had any direct involvement in the conflict.

A logistics company with no government contracts and no presence in Eastern Europe could still face elevated risk if it used software from a vendor with Ukrainian development operations, if its freight management platform was hosted on infrastructure targeted by Russian actors, or if it was perceived as supporting Western supply chains. The connection does not need to be direct for the exposure to be real.

Conditions that commonly emerge during periods of conflict include increased hacktivist activity targeting organisations perceived as aligned with opposing sides:

• Opportunistic exploitation of internet-facing vulnerabilities increases as adversary groups scan for accessible targets across a wider range of sectors.
• Phishing and social engineering campaigns adopt conflict-related themes, exploiting public interest and emotional responses to increase click rates and credential harvesting success.
• Distributed denial-of-service attacks against websites, public-facing services, and operational technology environments increase in frequency and are often used as a visible demonstration of hacktivist capability.
• Supply chain disruption affects organisations that rely on software, hardware, or services sourced from regions involved in or adjacent to the conflict, creating both operational and security risk.

Direct Targeting vs Indirect Exposure

Understanding the distinction between direct targeting and indirect exposure is important for calibrating the right response. Both create real risk, but they require different assessment approaches and different controls.

Direct targeting occurs when an adversary deliberately selects an organisation as a target based on its identity, sector, data, or perceived affiliation. Government agencies, defence contractors, critical infrastructure operators, and organisations with high-value intellectual property are most commonly directly targeted. The adversary has a specific objective and the organisation is chosen to achieve it.

Indirect exposure occurs when an organisation is affected not because it was chosen, but because of its connections, dependencies, or position in a broader ecosystem. Indirect exposure can arise through several conditions.

1. A supplier or technology vendor is compromised and the attack propagates through shared systems, credentials, or software updates.
2. A cloud platform, SaaS provider, or managed service provider used by the organisation is targeted, affecting availability or data integrity.
3. The organisation operates in a sector that becomes a broad hacktivist target, even though no individual targeting decision was made.
4. The organisation's internet-facing infrastructure is swept up in opportunistic scanning and exploitation campaigns that are not sector-specific.
5. A healthcare organisation, for example, may not be a direct target of a state-sponsored campaign but could face elevated risk if its medical device suppliers have operations in a conflict-affected region, if its patient data is hosted on a platform targeted by hacktivists, or if its public-facing systems are caught in broad exploitation campaigns during a period of heightened adversary activity.
6. A financial services organisation may not be targeted by a specific state actor but could face disruption if a payment processing partner is affected, if its offshore technology delivery team operates in a region under sanctions, or if its brand is used in conflict-themed phishing campaigns targeting its customers.

The distinction matters because it shapes the assessment. Direct targeting risk requires understanding adversary intent and capability. Indirect exposure risk requires mapping dependencies, suppliers, and technology platforms against the current threat environment. Most organisations need to do both.

Hacktivism, Influence Operations, and Opportunistic Attacks

Hacktivist groups operate with political motivation rather than financial gain. Their targeting decisions are often based on perceived affiliation, public statements, sector associations, or geographic location rather than specific intelligence about an organisation's vulnerabilities. This makes their activity harder to predict and means that organisations that would not normally consider themselves targets can find themselves in scope.

In December 2025, a joint advisory from multiple Western intelligence agencies including the Australian Signals Directorate identified pro-Russian hacktivist groups NoName057(16), CARR, and Z-Pentest as conducting distributed denial-of-service attacks and limited intrusion activity against organisations in NATO-aligned countries. The advisory noted that these groups targeted critical infrastructure, government services, financial institutions, and logistics organisations, and that their activity was likely to continue and potentially escalate.

Opportunistic attackers use a different methodology. They scan broadly for accessible vulnerabilities, unpatched systems, exposed credentials, and misconfigured services. They do not select targets based on strategic value. They select targets based on accessibility. During periods of elevated conflict, the volume of opportunistic scanning increases as more actors enter the threat landscape and as existing actors increase their operational tempo.

For the private sector, the practical implication is that not-for-profit organisations with public-facing websites may face DDoS attacks if they are perceived as aligned with a particular cause.

Financial services organisations may face increased phishing campaigns using conflict-related themes targeting their customers and staff.

Technology companies with international operations may face increased scrutiny of their supply chains and offshore development environments.

Operational technology (OT) operators in energy, utilities, and manufacturing may face increased targeting from both state-aligned and hacktivist groups seeking to demonstrate disruptive capability.

Influence operations add a further dimension. State-sponsored disinformation campaigns can target organisations directly, using fabricated content, impersonation, or coordinated social media activity to damage reputation, undermine trust, or create internal confusion. These operations do not require a technical breach to cause harm.

Why Supply Chains and Third Parties Matter During Conflict

Supply chains are one of the most significant vectors for geopolitical cyber risk. Organisations that have invested heavily in their own security controls can still be compromised through a supplier, platform, or service provider that has not. During periods of conflict, this risk is amplified because adversaries actively seek to exploit trusted relationships and shared infrastructure.

The ASD Annual Cyber Threat Report 2024-25 specifically identifies IT supply chains as a priority concern, noting that adversaries are increasingly targeting managed service providers, software vendors, and technology platforms as a means of achieving broad access to multiple downstream organisations through a single compromise.

The GRU-linked campaign targeting logistics and transportation companies supporting Ukraine is a documented example of how supply chain targeting works in a conflict context. Rather than attacking end-user organisations directly, the adversary targeted the logistics infrastructure that connected them, seeking to disrupt supply lines and gather intelligence on the movement of goods and personnel.

• Organisations should ask whether any of their critical suppliers have operations, development teams, or infrastructure in regions affected by conflict or sanctions.
• They should ask whether their managed service providers, cloud platforms, or SaaS vendors have been identified in recent threat advisories or have disclosed incidents related to geopolitical activity.
• They should ask whether a compromise of a critical supplier would be detectable in their current logging and monitoring environment, and whether their incident response plan accounts for supplier-initiated incidents.
• They should ask whether their vendor assessment processes are current and whether they capture the right information to assess geopolitical exposure, not only standard security questionnaire responses.

The Problems Organisations Face With Geopolitical Cyber Risk

How Organisations Should Reassess Exposure

Reassessing exposure in response to geopolitical events does not require a full security programme overhaul. It requires a structured, time-bounded review that connects the current threat environment to the organisation's specific business context, technology environment, and supplier dependencies.

The starting point is business context. What does the organisation do, where does it operate, who are its critical suppliers, what data does it hold, and what is its public profile? These factors determine whether recent geopolitical events are likely to have changed the organisation's risk level and in what ways.

• Internet-facing assets should be reviewed to confirm that the attack surface is understood, that known vulnerabilities are prioritised, and that exposed services are necessary and appropriately protected.
• Identity and access controls should be assessed against current threat patterns, including the use of compromised credentials, phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, privileged access management, and remote access security.
• Supplier dependencies should be reviewed with a focus on suppliers that operate in affected regions, provide critical services, or have access to sensitive systems and data.
• Logging and detection coverage should be assessed to confirm that the organisation would have visibility of the attack patterns most relevant to the current threat environment, including lateral movement, credential abuse, and data exfiltration.
• Incident response readiness should be tested against realistic scenarios, including coordinated campaigns, supplier-initiated incidents, and the communication requirements that arise when a cyber incident intersects with a geopolitical event.

The ASD's guidance on adopting an assume-compromise mindset is relevant here. Rather than asking whether an attack is likely, organisations should ask whether they would detect it, contain it, and recover from it if it occurred. That question often reveals gaps that are worth addressing regardless of the current geopolitical environment.

How Threat Intelligence Supports Better Decisions

Effective threat intelligence connects geopolitical events to specific risk for a specific organisation. It answers the question of whether a particular conflict, advisory, or threat actor is relevant to the organisation's sector, technology environment, supplier relationships, and geographic footprint. Generic threat feeds and news monitoring do not provide this level of specificity.

Effective threat intelligence means understanding which threat actors are active in the current environment, what their objectives and capabilities are, which sectors and technologies they are targeting, and what tactics, techniques, and procedures they are using. It means translating that understanding into specific recommendations for the organisation's controls, monitoring, and response posture.

Organisations do not need to build a threat intelligence capability from scratch. Engaging a specialist provider to conduct a structured threat and attack surface assessment, or to provide ongoing intelligence relevant to the organisation's sector and technology environment, is a practical and cost-effective approach.

At the technical level, threat intelligence supports vulnerability prioritisation by identifying which exposures are being actively exploited by relevant actors. It supports detection tuning by providing indicators of compromise and behavioural patterns associated with current campaigns. It supports attack surface assessment by identifying which assets and services are most likely to be targeted.

At the strategic level, threat intelligence supports board reporting by providing a clear, evidence-based picture of the current threat environment and its relevance to the organisation. It supports risk register updates by providing the context needed to assess whether existing risk ratings remain accurate. It supports incident response planning by identifying the scenarios most likely to affect the organisation.

Threat-informed validation, including purple teaming exercises that simulate the tactics of relevant threat actors, provides the most direct evidence of whether an organisation's controls would be effective against the threats it actually faces. This approach moves beyond compliance-based assurance to evidence-based assurance grounded in current adversary behaviour.

What Boards and Executives Should Ask

Boards and executives do not need to become cyber security experts to govern geopolitical cyber risk effectively. They need to ask the right questions and receive answers that are specific, evidence-based, and connected to business impact.

1. Has our risk level changed as a result of recent geopolitical events, and if so, in what ways and for which parts of the business?
2. Do we have visibility of our internet-facing assets, our critical supplier dependencies, and the technology platforms that underpin our most important services?
3. Are our incident response plans tested, current, and capable of handling the scenarios most likely to affect us given the current threat environment?
4. Do we have threat intelligence that is relevant to our specific sector, technology stack, and business operations, rather than generic alerts that apply to all organisations?
5. If a significant cyber incident occurred today, are we confident in our ability to detect it, contain it, communicate about it, and recover from it within a timeframe that is acceptable to the business?

Boards that receive only general cyber updates without conflict-specific context are not well positioned to make informed decisions about risk appetite, investment priorities, or crisis response. The quality of board-level cyber governance depends on the quality of the information provided to the board.

Fortura Perspective

Fortura's approach to geopolitical cyber risk is grounded in the view that most organisations are not direct targets of state-sponsored campaigns, but that indirect exposure is real, often underestimated, and addressable through structured assessment and intelligence-led controls. The goal is not to create alarm but to provide clarity.

We work across sectors including financial services, healthcare, critical infrastructure, professional services, and technology to help organisations understand their actual exposure, identify the gaps that matter most, and provide boards with the evidence-based reporting they need to govern cyber risk effectively. Our work is informed by current threat intelligence and grounded in the specific business context of each organisation.

Geopolitical uncertainty is not going away. The organisations that manage it well are those that do the foundational work: understanding their attack surface, mapping their dependencies, testing their response capability, and maintaining a clear line between the threat environment and their specific risk position. That work is valuable regardless of which conflict is in the news.

Conclusion

Geopolitical cyber risk is real, but it is not uniform. Not every organisation faces the same level of exposure, and not every conflict creates the same risk profile. The organisations that manage this risk well are those that assess it in their specific business context, use relevant threat intelligence, and maintain the foundational controls that reduce exposure regardless of the current geopolitical environment.

Organisations that manage geopolitical cyber risk well do not treat it as a separate programme. They integrate it into their existing risk management, threat intelligence, and security assurance processes. They ensure that boards receive specific, evidence-based reporting. They test their response capability against realistic scenarios. And they revisit their risk position as the environment changes.

If your organisation needs to reassess its exposure, Fortura's services including Cyber Risk Assessment, Threat and Attack Surface Assessment, Third-Party Risk Assessment, and many more are designed to provide the clarity and evidence needed to make informed decisions.